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TRUSTS-WHERE SETTLOR HAS PREVIOUSLY MADE AN ABSOLUTE GIFI'
OF CORPUS TO TRUSTEE-SELF DECLARATION OF TRUST-In 1930 plaintiff
received certain shares of stock from his uncle by way of outright gift. Seven
months later, in order to decrease ·inheritance taxes at the time of the death of
the donee, a declaration of trust was prepared and executed by the original
donor as settlor, and indorsed by the donee "as Trustee, to evidence his accepta~ce of the Trusts herein expressed," at which time the donee surrendered the
certificate of shares originally given him and was issued a new certificate as
. trustee. Plaintiff now sues for an annulment of the instrument. Held, the
document was void as a deed of trust, since the settlor had no property interest
in the shares nqthing passed to the donee as trustee, or to the beneficiaries. Nor
was a trust created in donee's own property in favor of the beneficiaries. Cole'man v. Coleman, (Wash. 1946) 17I P. (2d) 691.
The novel problem illustrated by the facts of this case ~pparently has not
been faced heretofore by the courts, nor even been suggested by any of the generally accepted textwriters. It is evident that a settlor cannot impose a trust
upon property in which he has no interest/ nor can he cut down his own absolute gift to a transfer in trust by subsequently executing a unilateral declaration
of such intention.2 · However, it would seem that if such a trust instrument is
assented to by the original donee of the gift, as was done here, then the doctrine
of Ex ,parte Pye 8 should apply and the transaction be treated as a self declaration of trust by the donee. Any doubts as to the genuineness and reality of the
trust are removed by the existence of a properly signed statement of its terms,
and, since all the requirements of a self declaration of trust have been complied .
with, a holding in support of the manifest intent of the· parties would appear
proper. The court in the instant case refused to adopt this line of reasoning and,
instead, relied upon the well recognized, but hardly apposite rule, that if an
owner of property attempts ~o make a gratuitous inter vivas conveyance to another to be held in trust for a third person and the conveyance fails,4 equity will
not complete the transaction by declaring it a self declaration of trust by the setBOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 44 (1935).
Allen v. Withrow, 1 IO U.S. 119, 3 S. Ct. 517 (1884); Vickers v. Vickers, 133
Ga. 383, 65 S.E. 885 (1909).
8
18 Ves. 140 {18u), which first established the doctrine that a voluntary declaration of trust of personalty is valid., See also I BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §§ 148,
202 (1935); 1 ScoTT ON TRUSTS, §§ 28, 32.5 (1939); l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,
§§ 17 (a), 28 (1935); Gulliver and Tilson, "Classification of Gratuitous Transfers,"
51 YALE L. J. l (1941).
4, I.e., it fails if the settlor does not comply with the formalities required by law
for the expression of the trust intent, or if he fails to identify properly the corpus or
cestui que trust, or if he does not adequately complete delivery of the corpus.
1 I
2
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RECENT DECISIONS

tlor as trustee.15 By way of explanation of this doctrine it is said that the putative
settlor intended to bring about the trust by vesting the legal interest in another
and did not intend to become a trustee himself. Just why this principle in any
way precludes recognition of a trust composed of the trustee's own property
where the latter already has received title to the corpus is difficult to understand. 6 Certainly the equities favoring the refusal by a donor to act as trustee
when he intended those duties for another are not equated in the denial by the
donee here to admit the imposition of a trusteeship which he originally accepted.
Further, the court is not called upon to complete an imperfect conveyance but
merely to bring about certain legal consequences in a manner actually intended/
That certain gift, estate or inheritance tax problems might arise should not be
persuasive in deciding the trust question. 8 On the whole, it is submitted that the
authority cited by the court is not decisive of the question before it and, as an
original problem, the equities point toward an opposite decision.9

L. B. Brody, S. Ed.
5
Milroy v. Lord, 4 DeG. F. & J. 264 (1862); Whitehead v. Bishop, 23 Ohio
App. 315, 155 N.E. 565 (1925); Landon v. Hutton, 50 N.J. Eq. 500, 25 A. 953
(1892); Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 49 N.E. 652 (1898); Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 477, 144 N.E. 686 (1924); I BoGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, § 202 (1935); 1 ScO'IT ON TRUSTS, § 32.2 (1939).
Similarly the courts have generally refused to turn an imperfect gift into a
declaration of trust, Miller v. Silverman, 221 App. Div. 697, 224 N.Y. 609 (1927);
Clay v. Layton, 134 Mich. 317, 96 N.W. 458 (1903); Loop v. DesAutell, 294 Mich.
527, 293 N.W. 738 (1940); Eschen v. Steers, (C.C.A. 8th, 1926) 10 F. (2d) 739;
Noble v, Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 P. 1047 (1908). It is sometimes difficult to
determine whether the donor intended to declare himself trustee or to make an outright gift. In general, on the various methods of giving another the beneficial interest
in property, see I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§§ 31, 32 (1935).
6
1 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 202 (1935), justifies the application of
the basic rule where there is a failure of delivery because the settlor "intended to bring
about a trust through a transfer to a third person or not at all." In the principal case
the plaintiff's indorsement of the trust agreement amounted to an admission of just
the opposite, that certain property was to be held by him in trust.
7
While delivery normally may be essential evidence of an intention to create an
irrevocable trust, it is clearly irrelevant to the validity of a self declaration of trust.
Knagenhjelm v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 43 R.I. 559, II4 A. 5 (1921).
8
For example, assuming a trust were erected on similar facts arising in more recent
years, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would undoubtedly be interested in
collecting an additional gift tax from the original donee of the gift as settlor of the
trust.
9
Although the facts are not clear, it would seem that the simplest solution to the
principal case would have been to consider the indorsement of the trust agreement
coupled with the return of the original stock certificat~ as a gift back by the donee in
order to permit the donor to remake his bequest in the new form. However, plaintiff
was probably precluded from this argument by a recitation in the trust instrument that
the original gift had been made in contemplation of trust, a statement which the court
regarded as untrue.

